

AMENDMENT UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 1.114(c)
U.S. APPLN. NO.: 09/422,347
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. Q56325

REMARKS

Claims 1-16 have been examined on their merits.

Applicants herein cancel claims 8 and 10 without prejudice and/or disclaimer.

Applicants herein add new claims 17-20. Entry and consideration of new claims 17-20 is respectfully requested.

Claims 1-7, 9 and 11-20 are all the claims presently pending in the application.

1. Claims 1-10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as allegedly being anticipated by Boivie (U.S. Patent No. 6,502,140). The rejection of claims 8 and 10 is now moot due to their cancellation. Applicants traverse the rejection of claims 1-7 and 9, and insofar as the rejection might apply to new claims 17-20, for at least the reasons discussed below.

To support a conclusion that a claimed invention lacks novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102, a single source must teach all of the elements of a claim. *Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.*, 802 F.2d 1367, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1986). A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found either expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference. *Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California*, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). A single source must disclose all of the claimed elements arranged as in the claim. *Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.*, 868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 102 are proper only when the claimed subject matter is identically disclosed or described in the prior art. Thus, the cited reference must clearly and unequivocally disclose every element and limitation of the claimed invention.

AMENDMENT UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 1.114(c)
U.S. APPLN. NO.: 09/422,347
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. Q56325

With respect to claim 1, Boivie does not teach or suggest a device that adds a suffix list to a common prefix to create a compound destination address that consists of compressed final destination addresses. Instead, Boivie illustrates a compressed address that necessarily includes intermediate routing addresses along with destination addresses. For example, at col. 4, line 55, Boivie discloses a compound address “R1 (B R2 (C D))” that includes intermediate routing addresses R1 and R2 along with the destination addresses C and D. *See, e.g.*, Figure 1 of Boivie. Boivie does not teach or suggest that the compound address does not include the intermediate routing addresses. The disclosure of Boivie relies upon the intermediate routing addresses being present within the compound address in order for the data packets to arrive at their respective destinations. In contrast, the present invention excludes intermediate routing addresses from being included in a compound destination address.

Independent claim 1 recites, *inter alia*, a means for adding a suffix list to a common prefix to create a compound destination address consisting of compressed final destination addresses. Independent claim 7 recites, *inter alia*, adding a suffix list to a common prefix to create a compound destination address consisting of compressed final destination addresses. Applicants submit that the Patent Office is improperly interpreting the language of claims 1 and 7 contrary to both established Federal Circuit caselaw and the MPEP. The transitional phrase “consisting of” excludes any element or step not specified in the claim. *In re Gray*, 53 F.2d 520, 11 U.S.P.Q. 255 (CCPA 1931); *Ex parte Davis*, 80 U.S.P.Q. 448, 450 (Bd. App. 1948); MPEP § 2111.03. The language of claims 1 and 7 recite that the compound destination address consists

AMENDMENT UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 1.114(c)
U.S. APPLN. NO.: 09/422,347
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. Q56325

only of compressed final destination addresses; intermediate routing addresses are excluded by the “consisting of” transitional phrase.

The Patent Office persists, however, in asserting that the compound address R1 (B R2 (C D)) disclosed in Boivie is allegedly equivalent to the compressed final destination address recited in the claims. However, this assertion is unsupportable for the following reasons. First, Boivie’s compound address necessarily includes the intermediate addresses R1 and R2. As contemplated by Figure 1 of Boivie, R1 and R2 are not final destination addresses, but rather intermediate addresses of devices that forward the multicast packets towards their final destination. The multicast packets cannot be sent through the network unless these intermediate addresses (R1 and R2) are included in the compound address of Boivie. Unlike the invention recited in claims 1 and 7, there is no disclosure in Boivie that teaches or suggests that the compound address (for packets being multicast to final destination nodes B, C and D) excludes the intermediate addresses R1 and R2.

In the Response to Arguments section, the Patent Office states that Applicants’ “claims now appear to exclude the branch from H1 to R1 with the intermediate information A {B.C {D,E} F.G.H.” The Patent Office’s analysis is completely wrong. In Figure 1 of the instant invention, a packet being sent from source node H1 with the compound address “A {B.C {D,E} F.G.H” will arrive at the nodes having the final destination addresses of “A.B.C.D”, “A.B.C.E” and “A.F.G.H”. Apparently, the Patent Office mistakenly believes that a packet using Applicants’ inventive compound address could not be sent from source node H1 to node R1 simply because the intermediate address for R1 is missing from the compound address “A {B.C

AMENDMENT UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 1.114(c)
U.S. APPLN. NO.: 09/422,347
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. Q56325

{D,E} F.G.H". Using Boivie's disclosed method, the compound address "A{B.C {D,E} F.G.H" would include the intermediate addresses R1 and R2, while Applicants' invention specifically excludes such information from a compound address.

Moreover, a compound address created under Boivie's disclosed method would be stymied in its transmission if, for some reason, intermediate addresses R1 or R2 were unreachable. Boivie discloses that if a routing error occurs, then the sending node (node A in Figure 1 of Boivie) is informed and the node A has to readjust its multicast tree. *See* col. 4, line 64 to col. 5, line 14 of Boivie. In other words, the intermediate addresses R1 and R2 are a necessary component of Boivie's addressing scheme. In contrast, Applicant's invention specifically excludes intermediate addresses from the compound destination address consisting only of compressed final destination addresses.

Based on the foregoing reasons, Applicants submit that Boivie fails to disclose all of the claimed elements as arranged in claim 1. Therefore, under *Hybritech* and *Richardson*, Boivie clearly cannot anticipate the present invention as recited in independent claim 1. Thus, Applicants submit that claim 1 is allowable, and further submit that claims 2-6, 9 and new claims 17, 19 and 20 are allowable as well, at least by virtue of their dependency from claim 1. Applicants respectfully request that the Patent Office withdraw the § 102(e) rejection of claims 1-6 and 9.

With respect to claim 7, Boivie does not teach or suggest a method that adds a suffix list to a common prefix to create a compound destination address that consists of compressed final destination addresses. The compound address "R1 (B R2 (C D))" at col. 4, line 55 of Boivie

AMENDMENT UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 1.114(c)
U.S. APPLN. NO.: 09/422,347
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. Q56325

includes intermediate routing addresses R1 and R2 along with the destination addresses. *See, e.g.*, Figure 1 of Boivie. Unlike the present invention, Boivie does not teach or suggest an addressing method wherein the compound address excludes intermediate routing addresses.

Based on the foregoing reasons, Applicants submit that Boivie fails to disclose all of the claimed elements as arranged in claim 7. Therefore, under *Hybritech* and *Richardson*, Boivie clearly cannot anticipate the present invention as recited in independent claim 7. Thus, Applicants submit that claim 7 is allowable, and further submit that new claim 18 is allowable as well, at least by virtue of its dependency from claim 7. Applicants respectfully request that the Patent Office withdraw the § 102(e) rejection of claim 7.

2. Claims 11-16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable over Boivie. Applicants traverse the rejection of claims 11-16 for at least the reasons discussed below.

The initial burden of establishing that a claimed invention is *prima facie* obvious rests on the USPTO. *In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984). To make its *prima facie* case of obviousness, the USPTO must satisfy three requirements:

- a) The prior art relied upon, coupled with the knowledge generally available in the art at the time of the invention, must contain some suggestion or incentive that would have motivated the artisan to modify a reference or to combine references. *In re Fine*, 837 F.2d 1071, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
- b) The proposed modification of the prior art must have had a reasonable expectation of

AMENDMENT UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 1.114(c)
U.S. APPLN. NO.: 09/422,347
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. Q56325

success, as determined from the vantage point of the artisan at the time the invention was made. *Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co.*, 927 F.2d 1200, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

- c) The prior art reference or combination of references must teach or suggest all the limitations of the claims. *In re Vaeck*, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1438, 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1991); *In re Wilson*, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970).

The motivation, suggestion or teaching may come explicitly from statements in the prior art, the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, or, the nature of a problem to be solved. *In re Dembiczaik*, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Alternatively, the motivation may be implicit from the prior art as a whole, rather than expressly stated. *Id.* Regardless of whether the USPTO relies on an express or an implicit showing of motivation, the USPTO is obligated to provide particular findings related to its conclusion, and those findings must be clear and particular. *Id.* A broad conclusionary statement, standing alone without support, is not “evidence.” *Id.*; see also, *In re Zurko*, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

In addition, a rejection cannot be predicated on the mere identification of individual components of claimed limitations. *In re Kotzab*, 217 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Rather, particular findings must be made as to the reason the skilled artisan, with no knowledge of the claimed invention, would have selected these components for combination in the manner claimed. *Id.*

Boivie does not teach or suggest a device that adds a suffix list to a common prefix to create a compound destination address that consists of compressed final destination addresses, as recited in claim 1 and included in claims 11-13 by virtue of their dependency from claim 1. As

AMENDMENT UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 1.114(c)
U.S. APPLN. NO.: 09/422,347
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. Q56325

discussed above with respect to claim 1, Boivie does not teach or suggest a device that adds a suffix list to a common prefix to create a compound destination address that consists of compressed final destination addresses. The compound address “R1 (B R2 (C D))” at col. 4, line 55 of Boivie includes intermediate routing addresses R1 and R2 along with the destination addresses. *See, e.g.*, Figure 1 of Boivie. Unlike the present invention, Boivie does not teach or suggest an address compression device wherein the generated compound address excludes intermediate routing addresses. Thus, Applicants submit that the Patent Office cannot fulfill the “all limitations” prong of a *prima facie* case of obviousness, as required by *In re Vaeck*.

Since Boivie fails to disclose the exclusion of intermediate routing addresses in a compound address, Applicants submit that one of skill in the art would not be motivated to modify Boivie. Although the Patent Office provides a motivation analysis with respect to adapting differently sized prefixes, Boivie lacks any teaching about the desirability of a compound address that specifically excludes intermediate routing addresses. In contrast, Boivie specifically includes intermediate routing addresses in its disclosed addressing scheme. Applicants submit that the Patent Office cannot fulfill the motivation prong of a *prima facie* case of obviousness, as required by *In re Dembicza*k and *In re Zurko*.

Based on the foregoing reasons, Applicants submit that Boivie fails to disclose all of the claimed elements as arranged in claim 1, and included via dependency in claims 11-13. Therefore, Boivie clearly cannot render the present invention obvious as recited in claims 11-13. Thus, Applicants submit that claims 11-13 are allowable, and respectfully request that the Patent Office withdraw the § 103(a) rejection of claims 11-13.

AMENDMENT UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 1.114(c)
U.S. APPLN. NO.: 09/422,347
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. Q56325

Boivie does not teach or suggest an addressing method that adds a suffix list to a common prefix to create a compound destination address that consists of compressed final destination addresses, as recited in claim 7 and included in claims 14-16 by virtue of their dependency from claim 7. As discussed above with respect to claim 7, Boivie does not teach or suggest an addressing method that adds a suffix list to a common prefix to create a compound destination address that consists of compressed final destination addresses. The compound address “R1 (B R2 (C D))” at col. 4, line 55 of Boivie includes intermediate routing addresses R1 and R2 along with the destination addresses. *See, e.g.*, Figure 1 of Boivie. Unlike the present invention, Boivie does not teach or suggest an addressing method wherein the generated compound address excludes intermediate routing addresses. Thus, Applicants submit that the Patent Office cannot fulfill the “all limitations” prong of a *prima facie* case of obviousness, as required by *In re Vaeck*.

Since Boivie fails to disclose the exclusion of intermediate routing addresses in a compound address, Applicants submit that one of skill in the art would not be motivated to modify Boivie. Although the Patent Office provides a motivation analysis with respect to adapting differently sized prefixes, Boivie lacks any teaching about the desirability of a compound address that specifically excludes intermediate routing addresses. In contrast, Boivie specifically includes intermediate routing addresses in its disclosed addressing scheme. Applicants submit that the Patent Office cannot fulfill the motivation prong of a *prima facie* case of obviousness, as required by *In re Dembicza*k and *In re Zurko*.


AMENDMENT UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 1.114(c)
U.S. APPLN. NO.: 09/422,347
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. Q56325

Based on the foregoing reasons, Applicants submit that Boivie fails to disclose all of the claimed elements as arranged in claim 7, and included via dependency in claims 14-16. Therefore, Boivie clearly cannot render the present invention obvious as recited in claims 14-16. Thus, Applicants submit that claims 14-16 are allowable, and respectfully request that the Patent Office withdraw the § 103(a) rejection of claims 14-16.

In view of the above, reconsideration and allowance of this application are now believed to be in order, and such actions are hereby solicited. If any points remain in issue which the Examiner feels may be best resolved through a personal or telephone interview, the Examiner is kindly requested to contact the undersigned at the telephone number listed below.

The USPTO is directed and authorized to charge all required fees, except for the Issue Fee and the Publication Fee, to Deposit Account No. 19-4880. Please also credit any overpayments to said Deposit Account.

Respectfully submitted,



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